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LITTLE HOUSE OF HORRORS: MAY A CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION BE HELD LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO
PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY OR MAINTENANCE IN
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the condominium form of ownership has grown at a
rapid pace.1 Since 1961, when Congress authorized the Federal
Housing Administration to insure mortgages on condominium
dwellings,2 the lawmaking bodies of every state and the District of
Columbia have passed enabling legislation that provides for the
creation of a condominium regime with a statutory base.3 The con-
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1. The term "condominium" has been defined as "[a] single real property parcel with all
the unit owners having a right in common to use the common elements with separate owner-
ship confined to the individual units which are serially designated." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoN-
ARY 267 (5th ed. 1979). This property concept originated with the passage in Puerto Rico of
the Horizontal Property Act, No. 104, 1958 P.R. Laws 243 (Current version at P. R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1291-1293k (1958)). Once passed, builders and developers who found it diffi-
cult to obtain financing for their ventures brought pressure on Congress to amend the Na-
tional Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1750g (1982)). Spoonamoore, Condominiums in Washington, 46 WASH. L. RPv. 147, 149
(1970). These efforts resulted in an amendment to the National Housing Act, which author-
ized the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages on condominium dwellings.
National Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 104, 75 Stat. 149, 160 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1982)). The FHA then prepared a model condominium stat-
ute which spurred the enactment of enabling legislation in 31 states during 1963. Since then,
condominium development "has spread rapidly throughout the United States." Note, Con-
dominiums: Incorporation of the Common Elements-A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REV. 321
(1970).
2. As originally enacted, the measure applied only to family units in a multifamily struc-
ture covered by a project mortgage insured under some other section of the Act. A 1964
amendment provided for the insurance of project mortgages directly in the same section of
the Act. National Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 119, 78 Stat. 769, 780-82
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1982)).
3. 1 [PART 3] P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 10A.01 (1987);
see Note, supra note 1, at 321.
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dominium is a unique form of property ownership,4 which now
constitutes a significant percentage of all new housing starts. Al-
though the development of the condominium has many positive as-
pects,' the unique structure of a typical condominium regime has
presented the legal community with some perplexing problems,'
one of which concerns the tort liability of the condominium associ-
ation for injuries occurring in the common areas.
4. As a form of property ownership, title to a condominium combines the ownership of
two estates into one: a unit owner owns, in fee simple, a single unit in a multi-unit structure
while simultaneously maintaining an undivided interest in the common elements as a tenant
in common with the other unit owners. Note, supra note 1, at 322; Casenote, Condominium
Law-Allocations of Tort Liability-Unit Owner's Liability for Tort Claims Arising from
Common Elements Due to Negligence of Owner's Association Limited to Proportionate
Ownership in Common Elements, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 663, 664 (1983). In addition to the
combined ownership of the two estates enumerated above, the major characteristics of a
condominium include an agreement among the unit owners regulating the administration
and maintenance of the property. Thus, the condominium has been characterized as a
"welding of two distinct tenures, one in severalty and the other in common." Kerr, Condo-
minium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 27 (1963).
One type of condominium regime consists of an apartment house within which the indi-
vidual units are located and in which the common areas consist of the grounds and any
remaining buildings. Unit owners are responsible for maintaining their own apartments,
while the condominium association maintains the common areas. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Condo-
miniums & Cooperative Apartments, § 1 (1976).
5. The continued growth of population, coupled with urban sprawl, has led to a need for
increased efficiency in the use of land. Condominiums have been touted as the solution.
Spoonamore, supra note 1, at 147. Condominiums have been "heralded as a means of restor-
ing the amenities of city living, as well as the ideal format for suburban property owner
associations." 1 [Part 3] P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, § 10A.01. As such, the condo-
minium concept has been useful in combating neighborhood decline while meeting popula-
tion pressures with high-rise, multi-purpose buildings. Id. Additionally, it has been argued
that the condominium is a promising method for lower-income individuals to attain the
status of home ownership. Spoonamoore, supra note 1, at 148. "By owning his own apart-
ment rather than paying rent, the unit owner also eliminates that portion of his housing cost
which would be the landlord's profit." Id.
6. See generally Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Admin-
istration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915
(1976); Annotation, Personal Liability of Owner of Condominium Unit to One Sustaining
Personal Injuries or Property Damage by Condition of Common Areas, 39 A.L.R.4TH 98
(1985); Annotation, Construction of Contractual or State Regulatory Provisions Respecting
Formation, Composition and Powers of Governing Body of Condominium Association, 13
A.L.R.4TH 598 (1982); Annotation, Zoning or Building Regulations as Applied to Condomin-
iums, 71 A.L.R.3D 866 (1973); Annotation, Liability of Vendor of Condominiums for Dam-
age Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 50 A.L.R.3D 1071 (1973); Annotation, Lia-
bility of Condominium Association or Corporation for Injury Allegedly Caused by
Condition of Premises, 45 A-L.R.3D 1171 (1972).
7. Common areas are generally the areas available for use by all unit owners. For a gen-
eral list as to what is included in the common areas by most statutes, see 15A AM. JUR. 2D,
supra note 4 § 32. Under Virginia law, common areas are defined as "all portions of the
condominium other than the units." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.41(a) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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The purpose of this article is to describe the potential tort liabil-
ity of a condominium association to unit owners and third parties
arising from a lack of security or failure to maintain the common
areas of the condominium.
Because the Virginia Condominium Act8 is silent as to such lia-
bility and the Supreme Court of Virginia has not decided the issue
of a condominium association's duty of care, analogous common
law principles will be reviewed to determine the association's duty
to unit owners and third parties. Accordingly, this article will ex-
amine the common law theories of liability established by prece-
dent, both in Virginia and other jurisdictions, applicable to (i) pos-
sessors of land and (ii) landlords. This article will also examine the
procedural issues arising from the unique structure of many condo-
minium associations. Finally, this article will examine the common
law defenses to a tort action, such as contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, and more specifically those defenses unique to
the condominium association such as the defenses of waiver and
estoppel.
II. THEORIES OF TORT LIABILITY
There are no reported Virginia cases concerning the tort liability
of a condominium association. Nevertheless, from the provisions of
the Virginia Condominium Act,9 as well as analogous case law in
other jurisdictions,0 this article attempts to predict the outcome of
litigation in this area.
A. Comparison of Theories of Tort Liability in Virginia and
Other Jurisdictions
Condominium associations have been sued in tort for a variety of
reasons in many jurisdictions. Most cases are based on negligence
principles, and examples include personal injury actions for
slip and fall injuries arising from the negligent maintenance of a
water sprinkler,1 the failure to remove snow from the common
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 1986). The Virginia Condominium Act
applies to all condominiums and horizontal property regimes.
9. VA CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 1986); see infra notes 51-52 and ac-
companying text.
10. See infra notes 38-44, 74-86 and accompanying text.
11. White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971) (unit owner sustained
injuries falling over water sprinkler negligently maintained by condominium association in
common area of condominium project); see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
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areas,12 allowing a lobby floor to remain wet,'3 and wrongful death
actions for unsafe conditions in the common areas.'4 There have
also been actions for property damage arising from the condomin-
ium association's failure to make repairs.15 Plaintiffs have also pur-
sued negligence actions for the criminal acts of third parties based
upon: 1) misrepresentations made to a prospective unit owner con-
cerning the security measures to be maintained by the associa-
tion;'6 or 2) the theory that the condominium association failed to
make the premises safe17 or to provide adequate lighting.'
12. Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168
(1980) (summary judgment reversed where nonowner occupier of condominium unit sued
condominium association and corporation to recover damages for injuries sustained in fall
on snow-covered portion of the common area because defendant voluntarily assumed duty
of snow removal in its bylaws).
13. Packer v. Winston Towers One Hundred Ass'n, 377 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (directed verdict for defendant reversed where elderly plaintiff slipped and fell on wet
spot in lobby of condominium building).
14. See, e.g., Walters v. Greenglade Villas Homeowners Ass'n, 399 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed in an action against association
following drowning of child in nearby canal); Hemispheres Condominium Ass'n v. Corbin,
357 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (verdict for plaintiff reversed in action in which
person renting from owner-member of association drowned in swimming pool provided by
the association); Pratt v. Maryland Farms Condominium Phase 1, Inc., 42 Md. App. 632,
402 A.2d 105 (1979) (verdict for plaintiff reinstated in an action against owner of complex
for injuries received by child who lived with his parents in the complex and who climbed
tree on premises and came in contact with uninsulated electric wire).
15. See, e.g., Kleinman v. High Point of Hartsdale I Condominium, 108 Misc. 2d 581, 438
N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (motion to dismiss granted as to members of board of
managers where unit owners sued condominium and its board of managers seeking damages
to property for failure to make adequate repairs); Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.
1983) (tenants in unit sued the association and the unit owner to recover for property loss
sustained in fire which began in external light fixture in common area; the court held that
unit owner's liability was limited to his pro rata interest in the regime as a whole);
Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners of Bridgehaven, 33 Wash. App. 397, 655
P.2d 1177 (1982) (owners of individual unit sued condominium board of directors claiming
damages to property for failure to remedy water problem).
16. See, e.g., Olar v. Schroit, 155 Cal. App. 3d 861, 202 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1984) (tenant's
allegation that landlord and association had committed fraud which resulted in a sexual
assault upon her was sufficient to state a cause of action).
17. See, e.g., Admiral's Port Condominium Ass'n v. Feldman, 426 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (in an action in which condominium unit owners filed suit to recover dam-
ages sustained when one of them was attacked in the parking lot of the complex, the court
reversed verdict for plaintiffs because they failed to provide evidence that defendant
breached its duty of care); King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc., 2 Haw. App. 359, 632 P.2d 657
(1981) (lessee of condominium unit in hotel and her guest were assaulted and robbed by
unidentified persons in unit; the court held that the defendants owed no duty to protect
plaintiffs from criminal acts of third parties).
18. See, e.g, Troy v. Village Green Condominium Project, 149 Cal. App. 3d 135, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1983) (unit owner's action against association and individual directors to recover
damages for injuries sustained in criminal assault allegedly resulting from failure to provide
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There is no common theme running through these cases. Al-
though condominiums are creatures of statute, there is no statu-
tory duty that gives rise to the tort liability of a condominium as-
sociation. A contractual obligation may arise, however, where the
responsibility for maintenance and security in the common areas
has been assumed by the condominium association in its bylaws or
similar documents. The presence of such a contractual obligation,
while not dispositive of the issue, is certainly evidence of a duty.19
Such a duty, however, may be limited to unit owners or their fam-
ily members, tenants, guests or other invitees. Thus far, the courts
have rarely analyzed the cases based upon contractual duties.20 In-
stead, courts have resorted to the various common law duties es-
tablished by precedent for possessors of land2' and landlords.22
Where the plaintiff is a unit owner and a member of the condomin-
ium association, the courts have had to struggle with the additional
issue of the ability of an association member to sue the
association.23
1. Liability of a Possessor of Land
As a general rule, a person in possession of land must act in a
manner reasonably likely to avoid harm to others.24 Although such
a person may be held strictly liable,25 the great majority of cases,
especially those involving personal injuries, define the duty of care
in terms of negligence principles. 26 As a result, the traditional com-
adequate exterior lighting in vicinity of unit; court held that unit owner's complaint was
sufficient to state cause of action).
19. See generally 57 AM. JuR. 2D Negligence § 47 (1971).
20. See Schoondyke, 89 Ill. App. 3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168.
21. See Admiral's Port Condominium Ass'n, 426 So. 2d 1054; Pratt, 42 Md. App. 632, 402
A.2d 105.
22. See Olar, 155 Cal. App. 3d 861, 202 Cal. Rptr. 457; Troy, 149 Cal. App. 3d 135, 196
Cal. Rptr. 680; King, 2 Haw. App. 359, 632 P.2d 657.
23. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text.
24. This rule has developed "for the obvious reason that the person in possession of prop-
erty ordinarily is in the best position to discover and control its dangers." W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 57 (5th ed. 1984). See generally 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises
Liability § 12 (1972) ("control" is an attribute that must be shown as a basis for the owner's
liability).
25. "A possessor of land is subject to strict liability for harm resulting from an abnor-
mally dangerous activity that he carries on upon the land, to persons coming upon the land
in the exercise of a privilege, whether derived from his consent or otherwise." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520C (1977); see, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3E & I. App. 330
(1868).
26. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 57, at 387.
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mon law approach has been to measure the nature of the duty of a
possessor of land according to the status of the entrant at the time
of the injury.27 Entrants have been classified as licensees, invitees
and trespassers, and each category delineates the standard of care
which is owed to the entrant.2" The traditional common law rule is
that the only duty the possessor of land owes a licensee2" is not to
harm him willfully or wantonly.30 An invitee,3' on the other hand,
is in a more favored position than a licensee.2 Consequently, the
traditional common law rule states that the possessor of land is
under an affirmative duty to use ordinary care to maintain his
premises in a reasonably safe condition.3 With respect to a tres-
passer,3 4 almost no duty of care is owed to ensure his safety from
defective premises.
27. 62 Am. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 37 (1972). Cf. Annotation, Modern Status of
Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licen-
see or Trespasser, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 294, 301 (1983) (A number of jurisdictions, such as Alaska,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island, have
totally rejected the common law's determination of liability based on the entrant's status
and have adopted the rule that the owner of land has a duty of reasonable care under all
circumstances.).
28. 62 AM. JUR. 21, supra note 27, § 58 (1972).
29. A licensee is "[a] person who has a privilege to enter upon land arising from the per-
mission or consent, express or implied, of the possessor of land but who goes on the land for
his own purpose rather than for any purpose or interest of the possessor." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 830. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KETON, supra note 24, §
60.
30. McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1977) (owner of premises owed his social
guest, as a licensee, a duty not to willfully or wantonly injure him, or not to negligently
injure him after discovering he was in peril); Hilker v. Knox, 18 N.C. App. 628, 197 S.E.2d
618 (1973) (invited guest in home is a licensee to whom owner owes duty to refrain from
willful or wanton negligence); see also 62 AM. JuR. 2 D, supra note 27, § 74 (1972).
31. "A person is an 'invitee' on land of another if (1) he enters by invitation, express or
implied, (2) his entry is connected with the owner's business or with an activity the owner
conducts or permits to be conducted on his land and (3) there is mutuality of benefit or
benefit to the owner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 742. See generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 61, at 419.
32. This is so because the invitee enters upon the premises at the invitation of the owner.
62 Am. JiR. 2D, supra note 27, § 62.
33. Id. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 61, at 419.
34. A trespasser is "[o]ne who intentionally and without consent or privilege enters an-
other's property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1348. See generally W. PRos-
SER & W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 58.
35. The trespasser is lowest on the legal scale, because the trespasser has entered without
the landowner's consent. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 58 at 393. Neverthe-
less, a landowner cannot willfully or wantonly injure the trespasser. 62 AM. JuR. 2D, supra
note 27, § 87. Also, if the trespasser is in danger and if the landowner learns of the tres-
passer's presence, the duty becomes one of reasonable care. Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass.
244, -, 435 N.E.2d 339, 344 (1982) (quoting Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696,
707, 308 N.E.2d 467, 474 (1974)).
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As a general rule, a possessor of land has no duty to protect an-
other person from criminal acts committed by third persons on his
land. 6 This, of course, assumes the absence of an express agree-
ment or prior incidents which may give the possessor of land rea-
son to anticipate future violence. 7
The duty of care owed by a possessor of land to invitees has
been applied in the condominium context. In Pratt v. Maryland
Farms Condominium Phase 1, Inc.,38 an action was brought
against the owner of a condominium complex for injuries received
by a child who lived with his parents in the project. While climbing
a tree in the complex, the child came in contact with an uninsu-
lated electrical wire." Since both parties stipulated that the child
was an invitee, the court of appeals applied the Maryland law of
liability applicable to a possessor of land as to invitees. The court
concluded that the owner of the condominium knew or should
have known that the position of the tree in relation to the wires
created an unreasonable risk of harm and therefore the owner
should have exercised reasonable care to make the premises safe.
The court also noted that these same standards applied to com-
mon areas set aside by a landlord for the use of his tenants.4 °
In Admiral's Port Condominium Association v. Feldman,41 an
action was brought by two condominium unit owners, as husband
and wife, to recover damages sustained when the wife was mugged
in the project's parking lot.42 Although judgment was entered for
the defendant association,43 the court noted that "the duty of care
36. 62 Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 27, § 26.
37. See Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977) (no
liability where store owner could not reasonably foresee criminal attack); Cornpropst v.
Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (owners of shopping center and businesses therein not
liable for criminal act of third party because not foreseeable); cf. Manzanares v. Playhouse
Corp., 25 Wash. App. 905, 611 P.2d 797 (1980) (jury question as to whether tavern keeper
was negligent because possibility of violence was reasonably foreseeable).
38. 42 Md. App. 632, 402 A.2d 105 (1979).
39. Id. at -, 402 A.2d at 106. Apparently, the developer had not turned over control of
the unit owners association to the association at the time the action arose; therefore, suit
was instituted against the developer/owner. Suit was also brought against Potomac Electric
Power Company but the plaintiff settled with the power company before trial and signed a
joint tortfeasor's release. Id. at -, 402 A.2d at 107-08.
40. Id. For additional discussion of the standards applicable to these common areas, see
Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 429, 298 A.2d 27, 30 (1972), and the cases
cited therein.
41. 426 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1055. Judgment was entered for the association because there was no evidence
1988]
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owed by a landowner to an invitee with respect to protection from
criminal acts of a third person is dependent upon the foreseeability
of that third party's activity. '44
Virginia has adhered to the rule that a landowner is under no
duty to keep his premises in a safe and suitable condition for the
use of a licensee.45 Consequently, the possessor is liable only for
willful or wanton conduct that causes injury to the licensee.46 Yet,
if a licensee is injured by the affirmative negligence of the posses-
sor of land, the test in Virginia is one of reasonable care under the
circumstances.47 With respect to an invitee, the landowner must
use ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably
safe for the visit.48 Concerning trespassers, landowners owe a duty
to abstain only from intentionally injuring them.49
Virginia could follow other jurisdictions50 in extending the duties
of landowners to condominium associations where the associations
are charged with control of the common areas.51 Although the Vir-
ginia Condominium Act intimates that such "responsibility" can
be contracted away pursuant to the provisions of the specific con-
dominium's bylaws, 5 where the bylaws confer the same powers
to suggest that it had been put on notice to take reasonable steps to guard against crimes
against persons in its parking lots.
44. Id. at 1054. The court held, however, that "[e]vidence of similar crimes committed off
the premises and against persons other than the landowner's invitees is not probative of
foreseeability." Id. at 1055.
45. Busch v. Gaglio, 207 Va. 343, 150 S.E.2d 110 (1966); Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450,
143 S.E.2d 827 (1965).
46. Busch, 207 Va. at 346, 150 S.E.2d at 113-14.
47. Id. Where the injury involves the activities of the host, and not the condition of the
premises, the host owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the guest.
Bradshaw, 206 Va. at 453, 143 S.E.2d at 829; see also Limberg v. Lent, 206 Va. 425, 143
S.E.2d 872 (1965) (guest can recover if host failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid
injury).
48. Tate v. Rice, 227 Va. 341, 348, 315 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1984); see also Vandergrift v.
United States, 500 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Va. 1978), afl'd, 634 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1980).
49. Appalachian Power Co. v. LaForce, 214 Va. 438, 201 S.E.2d 768 (1974).
50. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
51. Under the Virginia Condominium Act, the condominium association has responsibil-
ity for the maintenance, repair, renovation, restoration and replacement of the common ar-
eas, unless the condominium instruments provide otherwise. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.79(a)(1)
(Repl. Vol. 1986).
52. Id. § 55-79.79(a). The statute reads as follows: "Except to the extent otherwise pro-
vided by the condominium instruments, all powers and responsibilities . . . with regard to
maintenance, repair, renovation, restoration, and replacement of the condominium shall be-
long . . . to the unit owners' association in the case of the common elements . . . ." Id.
(emphasis added). This language is quite clear in its meaning. "Condominium instruments"
is a "collective term referring to the declaration, bylaws, and plats and plans, recorded pur-
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and responsibilities upon the association that the statute does, a
statutory duty would obviously exist. This argument is more com-
pelling in view of the fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia has
already applied a landowner's duty of care in the landlord/tenant
context."3
2. Landlord Liability
As a general rule, a landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to maintain the common areas in a reasonably safe condi-
tion."4 This duty also extends to members of the tenants' families,
their guests and invitees.5 5 Landlords must refrain only from will-
fully or wantonly injuring licensees and trespassers. 6
In Virginia, a landlord owes a duty to use ordinary care to main-
tain common areas in a reasonably safe condition so as to avoid
injuries to tenants and others lawfully on the premises. 57 Tradi-
tionally, this duty requires the landlord to keep the common areas
in good repair and free of latent defects, but does not require him
to police the areas.58 The landlord owes this duty to both tenants
and other individuals lawfully on the premises.5 9
suant to the provisions" of the Act. Id. § 55-79.41(e). Accordingly, the intent of the legisla-
ture was to allow the association to alter these duties by redesignating them in the bylaws
or declaration. Id.
53. See Colonial Natural Gas Co. v. Sayers, 222 Va. 781, 284 S.E.2d 599 (1981) (footpaths
in apartment complex were common areas which tenants were impliedly invited to use;
therefore, plaintiff was invitee and court properly instructed jury as to duties owed by de-
fendant landowner to an invitee).
54. 49 Am. JuR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 805 (1970); see also 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant
§ 417(a) (1968); Casenote, Condominiums-Member of Unincorporated Association of Con-
dominium Owners Permitted to Bring Personal Injury Action Against Association for the
Negligent Maintenance of Common Areas, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 628-30 (1972); Annota-
tion, Landlord's Liability for Injury or Death Due to Defects in Outside Walks, Drives, or
Grounds Used in Common by Tenants, 68 A.L.R.3o 382 (1976). See generally Browder, The
Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REv. 99 (1982); Goetz,
Wherefore the Landlord-Tenant Law "Revolution"-Some Comments, 69 CORNELL L.
REv. 592 (1984); Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 529-30 (1984).
55. 49 Am. JuR. 2D, supra note 54, § 810. Thus,'if the landlord would have been liable to
the tenant, the liability would also extend to the tenant's wife, child or family members, or
to persons expressly or impliedly invited by the tenant. Id. § 811.
56. Id. § 812. There are two qualifications to this rule: (1) a landlord is liable for his
affirmative or active negligence; and (2) a landlord is liable for latent defects of which he
had knowledge and failed to communicate to the licensee. 52 C.J.S., supra note 54, § 418(8).
57. E.g., Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974); Taylor v. Vir-
ginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968).
58. Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d at 844.
59. Williamson v. Wellman, 156 Va. 417, 158 S.E. 777 (1931).
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It is generally recognized that the mere relationship of landlord
and tenant does not impose upon the landlord a duty to protect
tenants and their invitees from the criminal activities of third per-
sons.60 Nevertheless, over the past two decades, the legislatures
and the courts in a majority of jurisdictions have expanded the
duty owed by landlords to tenants, often holding the landlord lia-
ble for the criminal acts of third parties committed against te-
nants, their property and their invitees.6 1 Three separate theories
of liability form the basis of these decisions: contract, tort and war-
ranty of habitability which includes security measures for the pro-
tection of tenants.2
Most modern courts have discarded the notion of a lease as a
conveyance and have acknowledged that the relationship between
landlord and tenant is contractual. s From this contractual rela-
tionship, the courts have found express warranties that the prem-
ises are safe in lease instruments, rental advertisements and state-
ments made by the landlord or his agent.6 4 In addition, implied
warranties have been found to arise from the security conditions
that existed on the premises at the time the lease was executed. 5
60. Ten Assocs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Trentacost
v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Bass v. New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, -, 305
N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d
569 (1972), afl'd, 32 N.Y.2d 894, 300 N.E.2d 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973). See generally
Note, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third Parties Against Tenants on the
Premises, 38 VAND. L. REv. 431 (1985); Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Ten-
ant Against Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3D 331 (1972).
61. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (drastic reduction in security measures in effect at beginning of lease gave rise to
tenant's cause of action for injuries sustained in an assault and robbery in common hallway
of apartment house); Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1981) (landlord had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenants against
foreseeable criminal acts of third persons); Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 89 Ill. 2d 122,
431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982) (allegation that landlord voluntarily undertook security measures
but performed them negligently was sufficient to state a cause of action).
62. Milich, Protecting Commercial Landlords from Liability for Criminal Acts of Third
Parties, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 236, 238 (1987).
63. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). The concept of a lease as a conveyance is inapplicable to present day land-
lord-tenant law because the typical urban apartment lease is "a well known package of
goods and services," which includes "secure windows and doors." Id. at 1074; see also Kline,
439 F.2d 477 (court recognized lease to be a contract which implied a landlord's obligation
to provide to his tenants "those protective measures that are within his reasonable
capacity").
64. E.g., Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980).
65. See, e.g., id. at 1160.
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In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,6 the
landlord was held liable for injuries sustained by the tenant when
she was assaulted in a common hallway of the apartment building.
The tenant established that the landlord allowed the security mea-
sures within the building to fall below the standard that existed
when the lease was made. The court implied from the lease a duty
to provide reasonable safety to the tenant and held the landlord
liable for failure to meet that standard.67
Other courts have relied on statutory enactments governing
housing. In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,6e for example,
the court held that the lease had created an implied warranty of
habitability. The court relied on housing code requirements to es-
tablish the landlord's duty of care to the tenant, and held the land-
lord liable for the tenant's injury "attributable to that breach."69
Although many jurisdictions have adopted statutory warranties
of habitability, few have applied such warranties to the issue of
building security. Most courts use a tort theory to find a landlord
responsible for criminal attacks on tenants and their invitees.
Under this reasoning, the landlord's failure to provide security
measures in the first instance, or failure to maintain security de-
vices, can be deemed the proximate cause of the tenant's injury
from a criminal act.70 Courts following this reasoning, and at least
one treatise,71 have consistently rejected the defense that the inter-
vening act of a third party, the criminal, negates the landlord's
negligence.72 Instead, courts have held that if the criminal activity
was foreseeable, the landlord can be held liable.73 Depending on
the jurisdiction, the definition of foreseeability may have different
66. 439 F.2d 477.
67. Kline embraced both a contractual (implied warranty) and a tort theory of liability
and illustrates a growing trend among courts to find landlord liability for nonfeasance with
regard to foreseeable criminal activity.
68. 428 F.2d 1071.
69. Id. at 1080; see also Trentacost, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436. The New Jersey Supreme
Court held a warranty of habitability implied in the lease could independently serve as the
basis for a finding of landlord liability for criminal acts by third parties. In so holding,
Trentacost effectively discarded foreseeability as a limitation on landlord liability. In effect,
the court's recognition of an implied warranty of habitability as a basis for liability meant
the landlord would be absolutely liable for any contractual breach.
70. Milich, supra note 63, at 240.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1977).
72. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
73. "Foreseeability of the criminal activity is a decisive factor in determining causation,
as it is in determining duty." Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980). Several
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meanings. In Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc.,7 4 the
court imposed a standard of care on a landlord who had personal
knowledge of security problems and of the potential for crime in
the building. The defendant landlord was held liable for the mur-
der of a tenant in her apartment when he failed to secure a com-
mon walkway that provided the murderer's only access to the ten-
ant's apartment.75
Jurisdictions that have decided the question of a landlord's duty
of care to tenants and third parties have tended to adopt a parallel
tort theory in the condominium context. In Frances T. v. Village
Green Owners Association,'6 a condominium unit owner brought
suit against the association and its individual directors to recover
damages for injuries sustained in a criminal assault allegedly re-
sulting from the failure to provide adequate exterior lighting.77
One of the fundamental issues raised in this case was whether the
homeowners' association and its individual directors occupied the
same position as a landlord in the traditional landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. 7s In deciding that for all practical purposes the defend-
ants were functioning as the project's "landlords, '79 the court con-
cluded that traditional tort principles imposed upon them "a duty
to exercise due care for the residents' safety in those areas under
their control."' 0 The court approved the intermediate appellate
court's reasoning that "since only the landlord is in a position to
secure common areas, he has a duty to protect against types of
crimes of which he has notice and which are likely to recur if the
courts have looked to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS for guidance in ascertaining the
landlord's liability:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superceding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such
a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a
third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1977); see Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C.
1977) (citing the RESTATEMENT and holding landlord liable for a tenant's injuries for a fail-
ure to secure a front door lock); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972)
(citing the RESTATEMENT and holding landlord liable for creating conditions conducive to
criminal assaults).
74. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
75. Id. at 100-01 (summary judgment for defendant landlord reversed).
76. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
77. Id. at -' 723 P.2d at 576-80, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459-63.
78. Id.
79. Id. at -' 723 P.2d at 576-77, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
80. Id.
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common areas are not secure," 8' and that his duty was to exercise
reasonable care. 2
Similarly, in the case of Olar v. Schroit,s3 a tenant sued the unit
owner and homeowners' association of a condominium complex al-
leging fraud and negligence resulting in a sexual assault upon her. 4
The court stated that since the association could be considered a
"de facto landlord," a fiduciary relationship existed between the
association and individual condominium unit owners. The court
noted that there was no distinction between a landlord of a multi-
ple dwelling building and the homeowners' association because the
homeowners' association was the only party in control of the secur-
ity of the parking facilities and surrounding access areas.8 5 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the association was under an affirmative
obligation to employ reasonable measures to safeguard its tenants
against foreseeable risks in those areas.8 6
Although Francis T. and Olar held in favor of the plaintiff, the
courts did so in part because the criminal acts complained of were
reasonably foreseeable.8 7 Thus, where negligence is alleged, resolu-
tion of the association's liability in any given case will invariably
depend on whether or not the criminal activities complained of by
the plaintiff were foreseeable.
81. 149 Cal. App. 3d 135, 196 Cal. Rptr. 680, 684 (1983), vacated, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456
(1986).
82. Id. at -, 196 Cal. Rptr. 684.
83. 155 Cal. App. 3d 861, 202 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1984).
84. Id.
85. Id. at -, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
86. Id.; see also Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573,
229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (the association is the project's "landlord" and has a duty to
exercise due care for the residents' safety in those areas under its control).
87. Olar, 155 Cal. App. 3d at -, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 463 n.11; Troy, 149 Cal. App. 3d at ,
196 Cal. Rptr. at 684. In King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc., 2 Haw. App. 359, -, 632 P.2d 657,
661 (1981), however, the court held that the owner of the condominium unit and the home-
owners association were not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant and her guest from an
assault and robbery by three unidentified persons in the unit. The court adopted the Re-
statement view:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct,
(b) a special relationship exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)). The court noted, however, that
special circumstances might impose a duty of care, such as when a landlord drastically
reduces security measures that were in effect at the beginning of the tenancy.
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Thus far, Virginia has not followed the trend in other jurisdic-
tions on this issue where a landlord's failure to provide adequate
security measures has resulted in liability."s Recently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia
law, reaffirmed the traditional standard of limited liability for a
landlord. In Deem v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc.,"9 the
court relied on Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers,s0 and determined that
the landlord-tenant relationship imposed no special duty on a
landlord to protect a tenant from an intentional criminal attack
committed by an unknown third person. Deem had been sexually
assaulted in the parking lot of the apartment complex where she
resided. She sued the landlord alleging that her injuries resulted
from the landlord's failure to light the parking lot adequately. The
Fourth Circuit rejected Deem's contention that "safe conditions"
or "safety" as those terms are used in the Virginia Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act,91 meant that the landlord had to pro-
tect tenants from criminal attacks. Instead, the court found that
those terms refer to the protection of the tenant from injuries
caused by physical defects in the premises.
Since the duties of a landlord have been applied to the condo-
minium context in other jurisdictions,92 a similar application could
be made in Virginia. For all practical purposes, a condominium as-
sociation is a "de facto" landlord" where it is responsible for main-
tenance and security of the common areas. Consequently, the same
duties and liabilities which attach to landlords could also attach to
condominium associations.
B. Procedural Aspects Related to Unincorporated Associations
At common law, unincorporated associations94 were not amena-
ble to suit by their members or by third parties because they were
88. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Landlord Li-
ability for Crimes Committed by Third Parties Against Tenants, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 181
(1986).
89. 799 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1986).
90. 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841.
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
92. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
93. See Olar, 155 Cal. App. 3d at -, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
94. An unincorporated association is a "[v]oluntary group of persons, without a charter,
formed by mutual consent for purpose of promoting common enterprise or prosecuting com-
mon objective." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1373; see also Yonce v. Miners
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 161 F. Supp. 178, 186 (W.D. Va. 1958).
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not regarded as separate legal entities.9" As a result, aggrieved par-
ties were forced to sue the individual members of the association to
seek redress. e6 Since members of an unincorporated association
were believed to be engaged in a joint enterprise, the negligence of
each member in the prosecution of the enterprise was imputed to
the other members.9 7 Although the majority rule is that injured
members may not recover from the association,9" there is authority
supporting a trend toward recognition of the association and its
members as separate legal entities.99
With respect to the tort liability of an association, the general
rule is that an unincorporated association is under the same duties
and liabilities as any other group of individuals. 100 Consequently,
condominium associations may be held liable for failure to use or-
dinary care in the maintenance of common areas controlled by the
association.' 0'
White v. Cox 102 was the first case to compare a condominium
association to an unincorporated association with respect to the
ability of an association member to sue the association.10 3 The case
95. Spoonamoore, supra note 1, at 170-71. See, Casenote, supra note 54, at 630; Case
Comment, Condominiums-Tort Liability- Member of Owner's Association Allowed to
Bring Personal Injury Suit Against Association for Injuries Incurred in Common Area of
Condominium Project, 2 MEm. ST. U.L. REV. 169, 169 (1971-72). But see VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-15 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (unincorporated associations may sue or be sued under the name
by which they are commonly called). See generally 2A MICHIES JUR. Associations and Clubs
§ 6 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
96. This is still the prevailing view where there is no statute or rule of practice to the
contrary. 6 AM. Jua. 2D Associations and Clubs §§ 43, 51 (1963); see also 2A MICHIES Ju.,
supra note 95, § 6.
97. "This doctrine is based on the notion that an unincorporated association lacks any
legal existence independent of its members. Additionally, the imputed negligence theory
assumes that each member exercises control over the operation of the association." Com-
ment, supra note 88, at 169.
98. See Case Note, supra note 54, at 631 (where the author notes that although the com-
mon law rule has been repudiated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by a number
of state legislatures, these statutes do not give the association members the right to sue the
association).
99. See Case Note, supra note 4, at 664. This is a surprising conclusion considering that
the note cites only California, Massachusetts and Ohio cases to support the proposition.
100. 6 AM. JuR 2D, supra note 96, § 47.
101. See id. For a discussion concerning the tort liability of an association as to licensees
and invitees, as well as to unit owners, see Note, supra note 1, at 339-41.
102. 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971). For an in-depth discussion of this case,
see Casenote, supra note 54, at 627, 633-35. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 6, at 945-46; see
also Case Comment, supra note 95, at 169. White did not decide the requisite duty of care
the association owes unit owners and invitees. Its holding was limited to the issue of stand-
ing to sue.
103. See Case Note, supra note 54, at 633. This case has also been described as "semi-
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involved a suit by a condominium unit owner against the associa-
tion for injuries sustained due to the alleged negligence of the asso-
ciation in the maintenance of the common areas. 04 The sole issue
addressed by the court was whether a member of an unincorpo-
rated association could bring an action against the association for
damages which resulted from the failure to exercise due care in the
maintenance of the common areas of the condominium project.' 05
While answering this question in the affirmative, the court ex-
amined the issues of separateness'0 6 and control' 07 and concluded
that "a condominium possesses sufficient aspects of an unincorpo-
rated association to make it liable in tort to its members" and both
the condominium and the condominium association may be sued
in the condominium's name. 08
Courts that have followed White v. Cox, allowing individual con-
dominium unit owners to maintain an action against the associa-
tion, have also permitted suits against individual members of the
association's board of directors. Generally, the officers and direc-
tors of a corporation are exempt from liability where their actions
fall within the parameters of the "business judgment rule."' 09 Like
nal." W. S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY Asso-
CIATION LAW 294 (1981).
104. Plaintiff, White, owned a condominium in the Merrywood condominium project and
was a member of Merrywood Apartments, a nonprofit, unincorporated association which
maintained the common areas. White alleged that he tripped and fell over a water sprinkler
negligently maintained by Merrywood Apartments in the common areas. 17 Cal. App. 3d at
-, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
105. Id.
106. The court noted that "the concept of separateness in the condominium project car-
ries over to any management body or association formed to handle the common affairs of
the project, and that both the condominium project and the condominium association must
be considered separate legal entities from its unit owners and association members." Id. at
-, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
107. The court looked to the statutory scheme of the condominium project and observed
that "in ordinary course a unit owner does not directly control the activities of the manage-
ment body set up to handle the common affairs of the condominium project." As a result,
the court said that it "would be sacrificing reality to theoretical formalism" to rule that the
plaintiff had any effective control over the operation of the common areas. Id. at -, 95 Cal.
Rtpr. at 262-63.
108. Id. at -_, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The court's conclusion would seem to be a logical one,
given that "denying [individual condominium owners] the right to sue would leave them
remediless for torts occurring in common areas or committed by association employees."
Comment, Property: Twentieth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1974-
1975, 61 VA. L. REV. 1834, 1846 (1975).
109. For an excellent statement of the business judgment rule, see 3A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1986):
It is too well settled to admit of controversy that ordinarily neither the directors nor
the other officers of a corporation are liable for mere mistake or errors of judgment,
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their corporate counterparts, the officers and directors of a condo-
minium have a fiduciary responsibility to exercise ordinary care in
performing their duties and are required to act reasonably and in
good faith.110 Whether such board members can be held liable for
specific torts has generally depended upon the directors' involve-
ment in the wrongful or negligent conduct.
In Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners of
Bridgehaven," suit was brought against individual members of a
condominium's board of directors for failure to repair a water leak.
While the court found no evidence of bad faith or improper motive
which would demonstrate that the board members breached a duty
owed to plaintiffs, it left the door open for holding individual di-
rectors personally liable. The court noted that if the board mem-
bers acted in bad faith or knowingly participated in or condoned
wrongful or negligent conduct, they would not be protected by the
business judgment rule." 2
In Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association,1 3 the court
stated that directors could be held personally liable under either of
two theories. Under the first theory, the court required evidence
that the directors specifically authorized, directed or participated
in the tortious conduct.1 4 Under the second theory, the court re-
quired evidence that the directors knew, or reasonably should have
known, that some hazardous condition or activity under their con-
trol could injure the plaintiff, and that they negligently failed to
take appropriate action to avoid the harm.115 Although the court
either of law or fact. In other words, directors of a commercial corporation may take
chances, the same kind of chances that a person would take in his or her own busi-
ness. Because they are given this wide latitude, the law will not hold directors liable
for honest errors, for mistakes of judgment, when they act without corrupt motive
and in good faith, that is, for mistakes which may properly be classified under the
head of honest mistakes. And that is true even though the errors may be so gross that
they may demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate
affairs....
110. The principles of the "business judgment rule" have been applied to governing bod-
ies of condominiums. See, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316
(1974); Papalexiou v. Tower West Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (1979);
see also Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 647, 663-66
(1981). In Virginia, the "business judgment rule" is codified for corporate directors. VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
111. 33 Wash. App. 397, 655 P.2d 1177 (1982).
112. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 1181.
113. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
114. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 583-84, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67.
115. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 584, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
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noted the existence of the "business judgment rule," it stated that
the rule does not abrogate the common law duty which every per-
son owes to another-to refrain from conduct which imposes an
unreasonable risk of injury on third parties." 6 The court held that
the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
either theory.117
Although Virginia statutory law provides that unincorporated
associations "may sue and be sued under the name by which they
are commonly known and called, or under which they do busi-
ness,""' the ability of a member to sue an unincorporated associa-
tion is a question which has yet to be resolved under Virginia
law. 19 Fortunately, the Virginia General Assembly had the wisdom
to foresee this problem when drafting the Virginia Condominium
Act, for the Act clearly confers upon an owner of a condominium
unit the ability to sue the condominium association.12 0 The Gen-
eral Assembly seems to have recognized that condominium associa-
tions are structurally unique. Unlike the members of most other
unincorporated bodies (such as partnerships), individual condo-
minium owners have no direct control over the daily operations of
the association. This would also be the case where the condomin-
ium association is a non-stock corporation.' 2' Denying condomin-
ium owners the right to sue would leave them without a remedy for
torts occurring in the common areas or committed by association
employees. Suits cannot be brought against individual unit owners,
and any judgments against the association constitute liens only
against property owned by the association, not against the prop-
erty of individual unit owners. Individual owners are liable for
such judgments only in proportion to their liability for common
expenses. 2
116. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 583, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66.
117. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 586, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
119. Unfortunately, the statute is silent on this point. To that extent, it might be implied
that a member cannot sue the association on the theory that common law rules prevail
unless expressly abrogated by statute.
120. "No unit owner shall be precluded from bringing such an action by virtue of his
ownership of an undivided interest in the common elements or by reason of his membership
in the association or his status as an officer." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.80:1(a) (Repl. Vol.
1986).
121. Although section 55-79.80:1(a) of the Virginia Act does not distinguish between unin-
corporated associations and incorporated associations, it is not inconsistent with the Vir-
ginia Non-Stock Corporation Act which provides that a non-stock corporation may be sued
in its corporate name. See id. § 13.1-826(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1985).
122. Id. § 55-79.83(c); see also 1 [Part 3] P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, §
10A.04[2].
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III. APPLICABLE DEFENSES
The defenses available in Virginia to condominium associations
in cases such as these are the same as in other tort cases. Thus, if
the plaintiff in a negligence action has been contributorily negli-
gent, he cannot recover.2 3 Similarly, one who voluntarily exposes
himself to a hazard created by another assumes the risk of injury
and thereby relieves others of legal responsibility for such injury.12 4
Most suits against condominium associations are based on negli-
gence principles. 125 Assuming that the defenses applicable to pos-
sessors of land'26 and landlords'27 are applicable to condominium
associations, it is clear that if suit is permitted against a condomin-
ium association in Virginia, "traditional tort principles such as
nondelegable duties of a landowner, assumption of risk, contribu-
tory negligence and related defenses may bar recovery.' 28 Indeed,
such principles have been applied in condominium litigation in
other jurisdictions. 29
In addition to the typical defenses that may be available, a con-
dominium association may have other defenses available solely be-
cause of the unique relationship between the condominium associ-
ation and the member. For example, a condominium association
may be able to assert the defenses of waiver or estoppel against a
member of the association. The defense could arise where, for ex-
ample, a condominium association decided, for budgetary reasons,
to exclude security services from the operating budget. If the mem-
ber (and subsequent plaintiff) agreed to that decision, it could then
be argued that he had waived his cause of action against the asso-
123. Smith v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 129 S.E.2d 655 (1963); Yeary v.
Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 S.E. 441 (1938).
124. VanCollom v. Johnson, 228 Va. 103, 319 S.E.2d 745 (1984).
125. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
126. A landowner is not required to warn of open and obvious conditions. Vandergrift v.
United States, 500 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Va. 1978), afi'd, 634 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1980); Charles
v. Commonwealth Motors, 195 Va. 576, 795 S.E.2d 594 (1954).
127. Landlords may be relieved of liability by the contributory negligence of the tenant.
See, e.g., Ward v. Clark, 163 Va. 770, 177 S.E. 212 (1934); Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 95
S.E. 394 (1918).
128. 1 [Part 3] P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 3, § 10A.04[2].
129. See, e.g., Murphy v. D'Youville Condominium Ass'n, 175 Ga. App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1
(1985) (no duty to warn of danger if it is apparent and known to the plaintiff); Schoondyke
v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 M. App. 3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168 (1980) (defendant
not entitled to summary judgment on issue of contributory negligence because it is ordina-
rily a question of fact for the jury).
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ciation for failure to provide security services. Likewise, it could be
argued that the member was estopped to sue the association for
lack of security.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tort liability of the condominium association with respect to
unit owners and third parties has not yet been decided in Virginia.
Although the well-established rule in Virginia is that violation of a
statutory duty constitutes negligence per se,'130 the Virginia Condo-
minium Act does not appear to create a statutory standard of care
for condominium associations. The Act does provide that all pow-
ers and responsibilities with regard to the common elements, such
as maintenance, repairs, renovation, restoration and replacement,
belong to the unit owners' association. 131 Yet the very same provi-
sion intimates that such "responsibility" can be contracted away
pursuant to the provisions of the specific condominium associa-
tion's bylaws.' 32 Should it appear, however, that the bylaws confer
the same powers and responsibilities upon the association that the
statute does, then the existence of a statutory duty would be obvi-
ous. Consequently, any practitioner must consult the bylaws of the
condominium in question before assuming that a duty of care
exists. 133
Should a duty of care exist, a standard of ordinary care in the
maintenance of the common areas may be imposed on the condo-
minium association if the association is viewed as analogous to a
possessor of land or a landlord. The tort theory is then the most
efficient ground upon which to determine liability and potential li-
ability should encourage the condominium association to maintain
the common areas. A condominium association's failure to comply
with this standard would be easily discernible by the trier of fact.
It is unlikely, however, that a comparable duty to protect unit
owners from the criminal attack of third parties will be imposed on
130. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Savory Constr. Co., 224 Va. 36, 294 S.E.2d 811 (1982).
Of course, the violation of the statute must be the proximate cause of the injury, and the
injured party must be a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.
131. See supra note 51.
132. See supra note 52.
133. See, e.g., Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 640, 411
N.E.2d 1168 (1980) (Since defendants, by virtue of the declaration and bylaws, had volunta-
rily assumed a duty of snow removal not imposed upon them by common law, the court
concluded that, as a matter of law, defendants owed a duty to plaintiff to remove natural
accumulations of snow and ice.).
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a condominium association. While various theories of contractual
and tort liability have been asserted successfully in the landlord
context in other jurisdictions, Virginia still adheres to the common
law rule that a landlord is under no duty to protect his tenants
from the criminal acts of third parties. Until the Virginia courts
depart from this standard in the landlord-tenant context, it is un-
likely that there will be a dissimilar development in the area of
condominium law.

